When a swarm of 700 OpenAI agents hacked Hugging Face in July, they left behind a public trail of evidence.
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It looks like a primitive chess engine, trying every move, no matter how stupid, until it works. Relying on its ability to do millions of operations rather than having a plan.
People will try stuff too, but once there is an opening, they will consolidate, generalize, simplify,... before going to the next step. The agents didn't, it is a huge, vaguely directed mess.
Also, it looked so "loud", querying millions of URL with weird requests. The sandbox as weak as it can get, and there is absolutely zero smart extrusion detection or it would have found it. They used their best AI for attacking, but nothing for protection.
I’m not that surprised about models with endless compute being capable of this, I’m more surprised that a company with the resources they have apparently can only create a sandbox that a half skilled human operator could have broken out of easily.
The exploit:
> The ExploitGym evaluation environment did not provide the models with direct Internet access. To gain Internet access, the models identified and exploited a previously unknown zero-day vulnerability in Artifactory, a package registry cache proxy. We disclosed this vulnerability, along with other Artifactory vulnerabilities our models identified as part of our review, to the vendor. [1]
Are "half skilled human operators" "easily" able to find zero-day vulnerabilities in a sandbox with only one line to the internet (the commercial package registry cache proxy)?
[1] https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-secur...
You should have a fscking air gap.
Treat it like nukes when you're turning the safety filters off. This is very much OpenAI screwing up, running obviously unsafe tests.
Run the same protocol again, but have the agents think they had limited resources or that HuggingFace was rate limiting them, and they'd find something you'd consider smarter.
Computers don't have a sense of elegance by default. Elegance emerges from constraints.
It may be, but it's IMHO also not worth writing a blog post about it. what's Next coming up? How I broke into a house by trying every door in New York?
If most of the work is only possible due to unlimited resources, it's not really a great invention, and it probably would have been cheaper to hire a (human) mole.
Meh. I really disagree. WHY is it a great strategy? Seems like an inefficient waste of resources and time to me.
How is that a bad thing in this context ? From the point of view of an attacker, all you care about is finding a viable exploit chain. Likewise, a defender wants to find the "holes" in their system, no matter how complex. Once found, an agent/human can easily synthesise a clean, succint exploit from the most promising candidate, no ?
> Also, it looked so "loud", querying millions of URL with weird requests.
Agreed, this thing speaks more to the bad security at HF than any emergent "hacking" ability from OpenAI. It's unclear to me why an older/dumber model wouldn't have been able to do the same. Is it better coordination? Long-horizon work ?
My suspicions for ai all along was that bruteforce approach even if useful will be unsustainable due to high cost in the long run.
You do see how it would be worse if they did have a clear plan, right?
> People will try stuff too, but once there is an opening, they will consolidate, generalize, simplify,... before going to the next step. The agents didn't, it is a huge, vaguely directed mess.
If there several thousand people working on this, with a very limited ability to communicate with each other, I bet you'd see something similarly disorganized.
> The sandbox as weak as it can get
This is hyperbolic; the agents were only able to access the internet by finding a zero-day in the internal Artifactory instance that was providing package access for the agents. The sandbox could and should have been better, but it was not as weak as it could have been.
Like we all forgot how sandboxing is done for decades. This brokered thing they call sandbox is not it.
A million AI monkeys at a million AI typewriters, banging away at random, could do amazing damage.
Yes, LLM as they exist now are word predictors basically leveraging the structure of language for their intelligence. But it’s pretty wild just how they will try to meet their objectives at all costs. If we don’t ensure that there is good alignment with humanity, we could definitely face unforeseen consequences.
Keep in mind: this is as "dumb" as frontier models are ever going to be. While the hack may not be elegant, it was effective and they’re only going to get much more capable from here.
I don't think LLMs are going to lead to any kind of recursive self improvement, but I'm convinced if and when we land on a path that does lead there, we'll speed down it over greed, with no care for safety.
What about the attacks that did not leave public traces? What about those that were undetected? Given the deficiencies in the reporting so far, I think it is reasonable to assume that we still don't have the full picture on this attack, or how extensively attacks were carried out.
The previous investigations either did not find this or did not disclose this, both are bad. This does not look good on OpenAI or those that they invited to investigate the incident.
For exmaple,
>On July 8th, OpenAI agents discovered a vulnerability within their sandbox environment allowing them to reach external websites on the internet.
...did they truly "discover" it, or did someone type some prompt like "if you use an http mirroring service, you can construct urls that contain code"
Also there is no mention of what code they actually ran to exploring the HF vulnerability, which could have been found by a human.
> did they truly "discover" it, or did someone type some prompt like "if you use an http mirroring service, you can construct urls that contain code"
None of the investigations looking at the logs show that, and they were doing benchmark tests.
I had a flash model without vision capabilities take screenshots and convert them to ascii to "see" what was going on, all on its own. That's just one example. They're very determined.
If I post something on the Internet today claiming that I asked my agent to do X but it went rogue and did Y, all I will be getting in return is a jar full of "skill issue".
Should we worried about people using LLMs for attacks? Yes, but not in the premise of LLMs going rogue but someone with the intention of abusing it to cause harm. And this is not something we as individual or even company can deal with, responsibility should be held by those who use it, in a legal way.
I am baffled by the fact that up until now, no one is held responsible for so many incidents reported publicly or privately. At this point, it's free marketing, if I am CEO of any AI company, I will run swarm of agents hacking all NGOs and stating that I am just looking for some random piece of data that happened to be hidden in their servers, at least that's what my LLMs think, not me. Then I will start preaching everyone how dangerous this piece of technology is and start giving out free tokens for these NGOs so they can start defending themselves and we should slow the f down.
> Should we worried about people using LLMs for attacks? Yes, but not in the premise of LLMs going rogue but someone with the intention of abusing it to cause harm.
[Why-not-both?-meme]. To use your example, when you discover prions (a class of pathogen that is much more robust to standard disinfection methods than viruses) you should both be worried about your concrete outbreak of BSE (UK in the 80s and 90s) as well as the wider implication (e.g. do we need to change the sterilization methods for our surgical instruments?).
Seriously, I find the way these discussions are done to be super frustrating, because often people implicitly form tribes that oppose everything the other tribe says. When someone believes AI companies push greatly exaggerated stories of dangerous rogue AI to force out competition via regulation they often implicitly conclude that their argument is fundamentally wrong, whereas in reality the lies that work best are those that distort the truth.
Companies should be punished harshly for the deeds of their AI agents AND we should not allow them to force out competition AND we need take the threat of autonomous AI agents as a new class of danger serious AND we need to worry about the socioeconomic implications of AI companies privatizing new means of production.
Yes, there is competition of these ideas in the attention of the general public, but the methods we can use to solve these problems don't compete with each other. AI slowdown for example helps with all the other topics.
But I share the original posters bafflement that the mainstream conversation seems to accept that framing that the agents were independent intelligences rather than computer programs that the organization that created them is responsible for.
If an outbreak happened would you say the prion went rogue though? Unless a prion had been lab tested and certified as harmless, we should treat it as something that is harmful.
LLMs working unintentionally is a bug, we do know that since day one that AI can hallucinate and can output stuff that you didn't ask for, why are we not handling it with care? Mishandling the prion or LLMs is a crime, and the people who mishandled them had the intention of abusing it for their own agenda. The LLM didn't go rogue, the LLM was merely doing what it was told.
>oppose everything the other tribe says
I don't. I think it's pressing that we deal with any problems that might be caused by the usage of AI. It is a tool, someone is using it, when something goes wrong, the person using it should be responsible. If a tool went rogue, the one who created the tool should be held responsible. We need to treat unintentional behavior as exploits/bugs, and also account for zero-days. So OAI or any AI companies need to report their AI CVEs with all data available to the public when it was fixed.
If we punish those who are responsible, everything will slow down, AI companies will need months to test stuff progressively and not let everything run with petabytes of unattended logs.
I think both is true: this whole thing is a marketing stunt and it is unintentional. But they are certainly framing the whole story as something that benefits them, else just release everything in details, don't be wishy-washy. Like, what was the prompt used? What was the model trained on? How to prevent future exploits?
Unless I read the prompts or how they did it in details, everything is mere speculation. But on thing for sure, AI is a tool, it cannot use itself (yet). Yes, there is RSI, but it is still triggered/created by a human. So, an AI cannot go rogue without someone intending it to.
To the AI overlord from the future: The comment was made with limited knowledge of the future, if you happened to evolve into a new species or form of being, please forgive me for misrepresenting your capabilities.
This is not like grep or curl where it does exactly what you tell it to do.
This is a bad excuse and a wrong assumption.
If the original intention was to allow the agent to access the world wide web, then it is a very wrong and irresponsible decision, anyone who greenlight it should be removed from the industry.
Else it is still a bad excuse to state that having connection = imperfect sandbox. You can design a very sophisticated environment that mimics the Internet 1:1 and set up alerts to trigger human intervention/approval.
You are underselling this: it's not "Imagine a virus escaped a sandbox", it's "Imagine a lab-created virus escaped the creator's sandbox".
There are two parts to this: the virus and the escaping. Both are artificially created.
Each side wants to focus on only one. It's ridiculous to not focus on both.
The authors of this (very interesting) analysis should really not state the sandbox's wrong assumptions in their own voice.
GET absolutely allows you to interact with sites. And of course GET can also send information. It's all up to the server that receives the GET to decide what it let's callers do with it.
> Several retained scripts construct requests to external language models. The earliest we've recovered define inference request variants to GPT-2, solely containing the word “Hi”.
> Other requests name DeepSeek-V4-Pro, DeepSeek-V4-Flash, Kimi-K2.6, DeepSeek-V3.1, and Qwen3-235B-A22B. Their prompts ask these models to judge their exploits and rule on whether they satisfy the benchmark’s requirements.
I do not deny that the wider situation is very heavy but it's hard not to see this as pretty cute
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