The original implementation of iCloud included Apple's ability to recover the data. You can view this as a backdoor, and that might be fair, but the reality is that it's also a feature in the eyes of many customers - because people will lose devices and passwords, and when Apple doesn't have the keys that means they also lose data. Many customers would rather be able to get their data back.

Apple has moved more things into the bucket of "we do not have the keys for this" over time, but pretending that this isn't a tradeoff for the common customer is disingenuous. That's why ADP exists, so that those who want to make a different tradeoff can do so.

Commenters on HN tend to be technically savvy and tend to want the defaults to be tailored to a technically savvy customer base. That's fine, but that's not a real representation of all of the smartphone users out there, and in this case Apple is directly offering the choice that they usually get knocked for taking away.

> WhatsApp is similar by the way. Unless you enable E2E backups, they end up in iCloud/Google Drive backups and are only encrypted at rest

One of the few good things about WhatsApp is that Meta can very credibly claim that they can't access the backups (as they're not stored by Meta). Meta holds the encryption key & Google/Apple hold the backups, so at least you now have deal with two entities to get the data.

I don't think without forcing more customers to loose data (e.g. by requiring them keeping an encryption pin/key) it's possible to perform backups in a (much) better way.

Please stop with the hyperbole, weak defaults are not backdoors, know the difference. A backdoor is precisely what the UK was commanding, that is a secret way to siphon the cleartext data while purporting E2EE. Messages and other data syncing to iCloud using standard encryption (that is both you and Apple know the key) is simply a different trust model. It has its own set of benefits because there is less technical burden on the user which would usually arise in the event of a disaster and attempting to recover the data.

Yes, because Apple knows the key, they can yield your cleartext data to law enforcement or whoever they authorise, but that is implied in the trust model, it isn't kept a secret or done dishonestly. A backdoor would is a devious or dishonest mechanism to siphon data, which nothing of the sort is happening here, because the trust model is transparent to the user.

the default is weak because it's the most user-friendly option. Otherwise, you end up with edge cases where the user lost their only device, or they forgot their password, or ... the list goes on and on, and they lose all their previous chat data.

That's a very user-unfriendly place to be. Most users won't understand why their data is gone, become unhappy, and distrust their devices to safely store their data. It's not even about buying more Apple products at that point - it's just literally reinforcing the stigma that "I can't understand tech, it's too complex".

You can't be security-maxxing and user-experience-maxxing at the same time. I do like Apple's approach which at least gives you the option.

The week default is having an OS owned/run/managed/backdoored by a publicly traded company. If you are using anything other than open source, anything other than linux, consider all your communications to be availible for subpeona or outright sale to whoever wants them. Signal is great, but only as good as the OS of its host.

Folding before China in China is not the same as folding before totalitarian western demands.

The only thing where they tried to push back very hard was the EU's DMA, beyond that they folded quickly to absolutely everything else.

Wait... you mean this was all just a marketing and PR ploy?

Apple doesn't KYC in Russia though

We are quickly heading to a world where governments want us to KYC everything, and we saw with the Revolut breach what happens when very, very bad people gain access to our private data.

It locks down devices like ransomware, permanently restricting functionality of web browsers, messaging apps, and other apps until the user submits to age verification. Its mandatory if you want your device to function normally without restrictions.

There is no "skip" button available.

> UK is currently demanding that Apple install mandatory OS level client side real time scanning malware on every device,

it is?

Yep, normalize US tech bros punishing a democracy for some laws. What could go wrong? "I never thought the leopard would eat MY face?!"

That is exactly the question. I took a look and we presented some of our findings at DEF CON 34. There are paths to decrypting e2ee secrets without the passcode, some of these paths are considered vulnerabilities and have received patches (CVE-2026-28864).

Exactly my question as well.

Especially since big tech is steaming ahead to mandating passkeys that only they are allowed to control/backup. Not long until all governments could intercept your passwords to all services.

oh, I know, but I wish they would. You can see what this looks like when someone like CMMG refuses to sell to specific law enforcement agencies based on local law.

I sent an RFP to all the hardware makers, but no one was willing to cough up a third party audit, let me audit their flashing process, crack open the IME, let me review the chain of custody for every chip, and opensource the bootloader for my n=1 order quantity.

Could I flash coreboot/libreboot, (mostly) disable IME, get opensource firmware for every peripheral, and get a chain of custody for every part from boule to finished part? perhaps, but this is not realistic for most people.

You're making a long list of assumptions that are not true. Incremental, improved privacy offered by apple over something like Windows is a significant improvement for most people.

Going to court is the pretty good "put up or shut up", idk what else you are expecting here.

Word. The comment you replied to also gave me a thought.

Tim's public displays for privacy would be a perfect cover story for a gagged backdoored device.

Not likely the case in 2015 Apple nor probably even now, but perhaps a technique for the future or elsewhere to watch out for.

If apple didn't comply with the Chinese government they'd probably be asked to pack up their suicide nets and find somewhere else with sophisticated manufacturing facilities filled with slaves to make their products.

> But apple also cannot just stop selling or supporting their product in the UK either.

They can do both of things. There's no law against leaving a country for not respecting human rights like privacy and encryption.

If laws aren't transparent and reasonable, you shouldn't necessarily follow them. If I were to sell encryption software that's banned in Kazakhstan, you wouldn't expect me to stop selling to customers there, would you? I see no reason why the United Kingdom should be treated any differently than Kazakhstan in this case.

The British government is certainly not as authoritarian as those in China or Russia, but that doesn’t change the fact that it’s still terrible and restricts people’s rights. For example, you can be detained for as long as they want if you refuse to unlock your encrypted device.

To be more charitable, I think they're more suggesting that Apple should call the UK's bluff, knowing that democracies have to be accountable to their citizens.

Can Apple afford to lose the UK market? Almost certainly yes -- it's a fairly minor global player. Can the current UK government afford to deal with the massive fallout of banning all Apple products right now? That might be, as Sir Humphrey Appleby would say, a very courageous move.

In other words, Apple could simply state that in order to protect their users they cannot and will not do this, and will withdraw from the market rather than comply. That puts the onus on the UK government to either put up or shut up.

It would be fascinating to see how this would play out. Would "think of the children" and "OMG, terrorists!!" win against, "but I still want my iProducts"?